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Abstract—The payment channel, which allows two parties
to perform micropayments without involving the blockchain,
has become a promising proposal to improve the scalability of
decentralized ledgers such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. Payment
channels have been extended to the payment network, through
which users can utilize existing channels as intermediary links
to route coins to others. However, routing payments through
multiple channels bears nontrivial overheads. It requires every
intermediary channel to lock a portion of its available capacity
until the payment is settled. This may lead to deadlock in a
concurrent situation. The intermediary nodes in a payment path
may also charge fees for routing a payment. The longer the
routing path, the more serious the above problems.
In this paper, we design and develop a novel off-chain
system to shorten the routing path for the payment network.
In particular, we propose the channel hub, which is an extension
of the payment hub, to allows transferring coins directly from
one payment channel to another within the same hub. That is,
the channel hub can be viewed as a shortcut device for the
underlying payment network. We design a new protocol named
Boros to perform secure off-chain cross-channel transfers through
the channel hub. We not only present the security definition of
the Boros protocol formally but also prove its security using
the UC-framework. To demonstrate the feasibility of the Boros
protocol, we develop a proof-of-concept prototype running on the
Ethereum. Our evaluation shows that our system can effectively
shorten the off-chain routing path.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of Bitcoin [31] in 2008, decentralized
cryptocurrencies have gained great popularity over the last 10
years. The key innovation behind decentralized cryptocurren-
cies is the combination of consensus mechanisms and hash-
linked chain of blocks. The use of consensus algorithms such
as POW [8] and PBFT [5] makes it possible for all of its
participants to maintain one single ledger without relying on
any trusted third parties. The hash-linked chain of blocks,
which is also called blockchain, boosts the computational re-
quirements for adversaries trying to temper the block contents.
Each miner running the POW consensus algorithm is required
to solve a computationally expensive hash puzzle. The one who
solves that puzzle was given the right to append a new block
to the blockchain. Inspired by Bitcoin, other cryptocurrencies
allowing users to develop and deploy their smart contracts,
which are written in a Turing-complete programming language
and support arbitrary complexity, have emerged. The most
prominent cryptocurrency that supports the execution of smart
contracts is Ethereum [38], which uses Solidity as the devel-
oping language of its smart contracts.
However, the deployment of globally consensus mechanism
such as POW leads to serious scalability problem for decen-
tralized cryptocurrencies. In its current state, Bitcoin can only
support up to 6∼7 transactions per second while Ethereum
supports up to 20 transactions per second [6] and there is
no order of magnitude growth of throughput with simple re-
parameterization [14]. Such a low transaction throughput is far
from enough to support the widespread use of decentralized
cryptocurrencies. In contrast, Visa processes up to 47,000
transactions per second [37].
Recently many attempts have emerged to mitigate the
scalability problem of decentralized cryptocurrencies such as
alternative consensus mechanisms [13], [25], [32], sharding
[21], [26], [39], usage of trusted execution environment [24],
[40], sidechain [2], [23], and payment channels/networks [7],
[29], [33], etc. In particular, payment channels allow two par-
ties to perform micropayments privately without broadcasting
all of them to the blockchain, thus improving the scalability
of cryptocurrencies significantly. To open a payment channel,
two parties need to broadcast a funding transaction together
with their deposits to the blockchain. After that, the payment
channel is opened and the two parties can perform off-chain
transactions securely without involving the blockchain. The
funding capacity of the opened payment channel is equal to the
total deposits of these two parties. The off-chain transactions
change the distribution of funds among the two parties. At any
point, each party can decide to close the payment channel by
committing the final distribution of funds to the blockchain
and get their cash back to their accounts.
Payment channels can be extended to payment networks
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[33]. Instead of conducting an on-chain transaction or es-
tablishing an expensive payment channel, one could utilize
the so-called routed payment, which routes the payment over
multiple existing intermediary payment channels, to transfer
coins to others. Efforts have been made to realize more
efficient payment networks. For example, Sprites [30] reduces
the worst-case collateral time for off-chain payments. Others
[15], [27], [28], [34], [35] focus on improving aspects like
concurrency, security, and privacy for the routing process.
Different from routing packets in traditional data networks
such as TCP/IP network, routing transactions in a payment net-
work faces more challenges. For example, routing a payment
through multiple payment channels requires that each channel
in the path has enough capacity for that payment. Moreover,
it also requires each intermediary channel to lock a portion of
that channel’s available collateral until the payment is settled.
This, however, may lead to deadlock in a concurrent situation
[28]. Another problem is that intermediary nodes in a payment
path may charge fees for routing a payment. Obviously, the
longer the routing path, the more serious the above problems.
In this paper, we propose a novel off-chain system to
shorten the payment path for the payment network. First, we
propose the notion of channel hub, which is an extension
of the payment hub [19]. The participants of channel hub
vary from individual nodes to payment channels. It allows
coins to be directly transferred from one payment channel to
another within the same channel hub. Thus, the channel hub
can be viewed as a shortcut device for the underlying payment
network. Compare with traditional node-level payment hub
[19], the channel hub does not require additional collaterals
and allows deposits in the established payment channels to be
reused. Besides, it could also benefit more nodes at the same
cost.
Second, based on the idea of channel hub, we design a
new protocol named Boros to perform secure off-chain cross-
channel transfers, which allows coins to be transferred between
two parties. The Boros protocol guarantees that an honest party
will not bear any financial losses despite strong adversarial
capabilities. We not only present the security definition of
Boros formally using the Universally Composable framework
proposed by Canetti [4] but also prove its security according
to our definition.
Third, we develop a proof-of-concept prototype running on
Ethereum to demonstrate the feasibility of the Boros protocol.
We measure the execution cost of each operation of the
Boros protocol in payment networks of different sizes, and
the experiemntal results show that our system can effectively
reduce the average payment path length.
Organization of the paper: In Section II, we provide the
necessary background and review the related studies on pay-
ment channels and payment networks. We introduce the main
idea of the Boros protocol in Section III and present its formal
security definition using the UC-framework is presented in
Section IV (Due to the page limit, formal security proof of the
Boros protocol is provided in Appendix A). Section V reports
our proof-of-concept implementation and the evaluation results
of the Boros protocol on Ethereum. Finally, we conclude this
paper in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
A. Payment Channel
Payment channels [7], [33] allow parties to perform
transfers privately without involving the blockchain, yet still
keeping the ability for honest parties to reclaim its rightful
amount of funds at any given time. Rather than commit-
ting each individual payment to the blockchain, two parties
broadcast a funding transaction together with their deposits
to the blockchain to open a payment channel. The funding
capacity of the opened payment channel is equal to the total
deposits of these two parties. After the payment channel is
successfully opened, these two parties can perform off-chain
transfers securely without touching the blockchain. The core
of a payment channel protocol is to reach a consensus on
the latest distribution of funds among the two parties and
prevent malicious one from rolling back. Decker et al. [7]
use the blockchain based time locks to invalidate obsolete
distribution of funds while the Lightning Network [33] relies
on punishment to enforce the latest distribution. At some point
when any of them wishes to reclaim their funds, they broadcast
a committing transaction, which contains the final distribution
of funds, to the blockchain to close the payment channel and
get their cash back to their account. Because all intermediary
transfers are maintained only by these two parties and not
required to be written to the blockchain, the payment channel
can significantly increase the transaction throughput between
two parties. The network bandwidth is the only limitation of
transaction rate.
There are several improvement proposals on payment
channel protocol. Burchert et al. [3] introduce a new layer
called channel factory between the blockchain and the payment
network so that it can quickly refund a payment channel. Green
et al. [15] propose Bolt for constructing privacy-preserving
payment channels while lowering the storage burden on the
payment network. Dziembowski et al. [10] design Perun to es-
tablish a virtual payment channel between two parties that are
connected by one intermediary. The virtual payment channel
allows these two parties to perform transfers and do not require
the intermediary to confirm every individual payment. This can
significantly reduce latency and costs while improving privacy
since the intermediary cannot observe the individual transfers
between the two parties. The state channel [11] allows off-
chain execution of arbitrary complex smart contracts. They
also propose a novel technique to recursively build virtual state
channel that spans multiple ledgers or virtual state channels.
B. Payment Network
Instead of opening an expensive payment channel or
conducting on-chain transactions, two parties without direct
connection by a payment channel can utilize existing channels
as intermediary links to route coins over the payment network
[29], [33].
The most critical challenge when routing a payment
through multiple intermediary channels is to enforce atomicity.
That is, either the capacity of all intermediary channels in
the path is updated or none of them is changed. To securely
conduct transfers across multiple payment channels, the Light-
ning Network [33] adopts a technique called Hash Time-Lock
Contract (HTLC). An HTLC is a conditional contract where
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the condition is enforced by the blockchain so it does not
require trust in any participant in the network. This contract
locks a portion of coins that can be released by its receiver
only if the condition is fulfilled or returned to its owner if the
contract times out. When routing a payment over the payment
network, the receiver generates a secret value R and sends
the hash value of R, denotes as y where y = H(R), to all
intermediary nodes in the path. Each intermediary channel then
sets up an HTLC using the hash value y to lock a portion of
its coins, which is equal to the payment amount plus some
optional routing fees. Finally, the receiver discloses the secret
value R to finish that payment and release the locked coins at
each intermediary channel.
Recent studies have further improved the payment net-
works. Sprites [30] reduces the worst-case collateral time for
off-chain payments. Malavolta et al. [28] proposes the first
non-blocking protocol for the payment network, where at least
one out of a set of concurrent payments can finally complete,
and gives an in-depth discussion on the trade-off between
privacy and concurrency. Revive [18] is the first rebalance
scheme for the off-chain payment network, which enables a
set of members in a skewed payment channel network to
safely shift balances between their payment channels to reach
a balanced state. There are also several works that focus
on improving efficiency and privacy of the routing process
in the decentralized payment network such as Flare [34],
SilentWhispers [27], and SpeedyMurmurs [35].
C. Payment Hub
TumbleBit [12] introduces the concept of payment hub
which allows a payer to perform secure off-chain payment to
a set of payees within the same payment hub. Payments are
performed off-chained with the help of an untrusted interme-
diary called the Tumbler. It guarantees that no one, not even
the Tumbler can violate anonymity and link a payment from
its payer to its payee. TumbleBit is fully compatible with Bit-
coin protocol. However, TumbleBit requires that the Tumbler
opens a directed payment channel with each participant. This,
however, would lead to fragmented collaterals and significantly
complicate the operation of the payment hub.
Khalil et al. [19] propose NOCUST, which allows the
collaterals of its participants to be centrally managed in
bulk and thus significantly reduces the operating costs of
the payment hub. A NOCUST payment hub consists of two
fundamental components: an on-chain verifier contract and
an off-chain operator server. The on-chain verifier contract
serves as a trusted financial custodian. It maintains collaterals
of all participants of the payment hub and is responsible
for resolving disputes. The off-chain operator server executes
every transfer and synchronizes with the on-chain verifier
contract periodically to keep consistency. NOCUST guarantees
that an honest participant can always maintain custody of its
funds and its enacted transfers can be finally delivered.
However, the node-level payment hub does not allow
reusing the deposits in the established payment channels. If
a node wishes to join in a payment hub, it has to come up
with additional collaterals instead of reusing existing ones in
its payment channels. In this work, we extend the concept of
the payment hub to channel hub, whose participants vary from
individual nodes to payment channels. It allows transferring
coins from one payment channel to another within the same
channel hub. After joining a channel hub, the deposit of a
payment channel can be used for both cross-channel transfers
and traditional in-channel transfers. It is worth noting that
compared with the payment hub, the channel hub can benefit
more nodes in the same cost. More precisely, both the payment
hub and the channel hub require one on-chain transaction for
a participant to join in. However, since the participant of the
channel hub is payment channel, it allows both parties of the
payment channel to benefit from the channel hub.
III. MAIN CONSTRUCTION IDEA
A. Channel Hub
We adopt the construction of NOCUST [19] and extend
the concept of payment hub to channel hub, which allows
transferring coins from one payment channel to another within
the same channel hub. Here, we only give a general description
of the payment hub and describe the differences between the
payment hub and our channel hub. For further details, we refer
the reader to [19].
A payment hub is composed of two basic components: an
on-chain verifier smart contract V6⊂ and an off-chain operator
server O6⊂. The off-chain operator server is an interactive
server that acts as a financial intermediary, i.e., all off-chain
transfers performed within the payment hub need to be relayed
and ratified by the operator server. Meanwhile, the operator
server maintains a local ledger BL which contains the balance
of its participants and all information related to the transfers
performed through O6⊂. The information in BL is periodically
committed to the global ledger BG , which is maintained by the
on-chain verifier V6⊂, to keep global consistency. Apart from
maintaining the global ledger BG , the on-chain verifier V6⊂ also
serves as a dispute resolver in case of malicious participants or
even dishonest operator server to guarantee the balance custody
of honest participants and enforce enacted transfers.
The core of the payment hub is a mapping: {0, 1}λ → N0,
where the fixed-length binary string {0, 1}λ denotes the ac-
count of each participant and N0 denotes its balance. The
key observation motivating our extension is that the accounts
of both individual nodes (known as external account) and
payment channels (known as contract account) share the same
address space. In other words, both of the external account and
the contract account are represented by a fixed-length binary
string {0, 1}λ. Thus, our extension can be simply accomplished
by letting {0, 1}λ denote the contract account of the payment
channel and N0 denote its funding capacity. Concretely, we
modify the Merklelized interval tree T 6⊂ data structure used
in NOCUST [19] so that each leaf of the tree T 6⊂ stores
the information corresponds to a payment channel βi, which
mainly consists of the channel contract account αi, the funding
capacity ci, and the last update ui that channel βi involved in.
B. Informal Description of Boros Protocol
In this section, we informally describe the basic idea of
Boros protocol, which uses the channel hub to perform secure
point-to-point cross-channel transfers. The Boros protocol is
designed to prevent any honest node from losing funds despite
strong set of adversarial capabilities.
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Suppose A wishes to transfer ∆x coins to B. This can
be done by first transferring ∆x coins from channel βAC to
channel βBD using the channel hub, and then updating the
distribution of deposits in channel βAC and βBD, so that
βAC .balance(A) −= ∆x and βBD.balance(B) += ∆x,
while the balances of C and D remain unchanged. The key
issue is to enforce balance consistency in the whole process.
We first describe the whole process of cross-channel trans-
fer in case all parties are honest. Figure 1 shows the messages
flow of the protocol. We assume that both channel βAC and
channel βBD have already joined in the same channel hub
H 6⊂. The Boros protocol consists of three phases, namely the
prepare, capacity transfer, and in-channel update phase.
AC DB
(1a) pccAC
(1b) gccAC
(1b) gccBD
(1a) pccBD
(3a) res
(3b) conf
(3a) res
(3b) conf
ℋ⊄(2a) iou iou
(2b) receipt
(2c) conf (2c) conf
𝛽$% 𝛽&'
1.	prepare
phase
2.	capacity	
transfer phase
3.	In-channel	
update	phase
Fig. 1: Outline for the cross-channel transfer with Boros.
In the prepare phase, A sends a message mpcc to C,
indicating that A wishes to transfer his ∆x coins from channel
βAC to channel βBD while keeping C’s balance on βAC
unchanged. The word “pcc” is the abbreviation for “Prepare
Cross-Channel transfer”. When C receives mpcc, C will check
the validity of message mpcc and broadcast a message mgcc
to both A, B, and D, indicating that C agrees with that cross-
channel transfer. The word “gcc” is the abbreviation for “Grant
Cross-Channel transfer”. The interactions between B and D are
handled analogously. At the end of the prepare phase, A, C,
B and D should hold the messages mACgcc and m
BD
gcc .
In the capacity transfer phase, A and B, on behalf of
channel βAC and channel βBD respectively, perform the coin
transfer between channel βAC and channel βBD via the
channel hub H 6⊂. Here we follow the operations of NOCUST
[19]. First, A sends miou to the off-chain operater server O6⊂.
O 6⊂ then checks the validity of miou, notifies B and waits for
B’s receipt. When B is notified by O6⊂, it will also verify
the validity of miou and then reply with a signed receipt.
Upon receiving B’s receipt, O6⊂ confirms the IOU execution
and sends mconf to both A and B. At that point, the capacity
transfer phase is completed. The funding capacity of channel
βAC decreases by ∆x and βBD increases by ∆x.
In the in-channel update stage, both channel βAC and
channel βBD need to update the distribution of balance to keep
consistency. Concretely, in channel βAC , A’s balance should
be decreased by ∆x while C’s balance remains unchanged; in
channel βBD, B’s balance should be increased by ∆x while
D’s balance remains unchanged. Taking channel βAC as an
example, in this phase, A sends C a message micu indicating
the result of the capacity transfer phase to C. The word “icu”
stands for “In-Channel Update”. When the capacity transfer
phase successes, the message micu will contain information
about the decrease on A’s balance. Otherwise, micu will tell C
not to change A’s balance. Upon receiving the micu, C checks
the validity of that message then reply with a confirmation
mconf. The interactions between B and D are handled in a
similar way and then the whole transfer is completed.
C. Security Properties
In this section, we describe the threat model and the
security properties of our protocol.
Threat model: We assume the presence of irrational
adversary willing to lose some or even all of its funds to
cause honest parties to bear financial losses. This irrational
adversary may take control of some or even all but one of the
participants involved in a cross-channel transfer. The internal
state and all of the following communications of the corrupted
party are exposed to the adversary. Besides, the adversary may
send arbitrary messages on behalf of the corrupted party. On
the other hand, we assume that the communication channels
between honest parties and the integrity of the honest parties’
identity can not be corrupted by the adversary.
Against the above threat model, our protocol guarantees
the following security properties:
• Consensus on channel hub enrollment and withdrawal.
Our protocol guarantees that honest parties can always reach
a consensus on whether a payment channel has joined in or
withdrawn from a channel hub.
• Consensus on channel capacity. Our protocol guarantees
that honest parties can always learn the funding capacity of
their payment channels. That is, an honest party can always
learn the result of every cross-channel transfer involving it.
• Balance security. Intuitively, balance security guarantees
that an honest party will not lose any of his coins despite
strong adversarial capabilities, i.e., an honest party will
not bear financial losses even when all other participants
involved in a cross-channel transfer are malicious.
D. Concise Proof of Misbehavior
We now investigate what happens if some of the parties are
malicious. Let’s first consider the prepare phase, whose main
purpose is to reach an agreement about the following transfer
among A, C, B, and D. That is, all of these four parties should
receive both mACgcc and m
BD
gcc at the end of this phase. If there
exist malicious parties that do not send or reply messages,
then there must be someone failed to collect both of these
two messages. Now we discuss the following cases: (1) A
cannot obtain both of these messages. (2) B fails to collect
both of these messages. (3) C or D cannot collect both of
these messages.
For case (1), the consequences are obvious. If A cannot
collect both mACgcc and m
BD
gcc , then he will fail to construct the
message miou in next phase, which leading to the termination
of the whole transfer. For case (2), B is quite tolerant since
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B can still get mACgcc and m
BD
gcc from the miou when he got
notified by the channel hub H 6⊂.
The case (3) is much more complicated. In this case, C
or D cannot determine whether this transfer is prepared to
be performed. In the worst case, they fail to learn whether the
transfer is performed or not. In order to eliminate the feasibility
of being inconsistent, we do not allow a party to involve in
multiple transfers at the same time. Besides, we introduce T to
denote the maximum transfer duration. When a transfer starts,
a party should learn the result before T . Otherwise, it will
complain to the channel hub. For example, if C cannot get the
result of that transfer from A, then he waits until T expires
and sends a force-reply message mfr to H 6⊂. Once receiving
message mfr, H 6⊂ informs A about C’s complaint, asking A
to provide the result micu within a fixed time ∆. If A replies
with a valid micu containing right amount of funding capacity
of channel βAC in time, then H 6⊂ forwards micu to C such
that C can proceed. Otherwise, H 6⊂ considers channel βAC as
unresponsive and then closes it, refunding their cash according
to the result of that cross-channel transfer.
In the capacity transfer phase, coins are transferred from
channel βAC to channel βBD via the channel hub H 6⊂. NO-
CUST [19] guarantees that an honest party P can always main-
tain custody of its funds and ensure that its enacted transfers
are correctly delivered within the hub. Such guarantees hold for
our channel hub under the same attacker model. In a nutshell,
NOCUST allows a party P to open the so-called “balance
update challenge” and “transfer delivery challenge” to the on-
chain verifier contract V6⊂ to enforce secure guarantees. The
former challenges against the integrity of P’s balance and the
latter challenges against the integrity of an off-chain transfer
deliver in the hub. For further details on security analysis, we
refer the reader to [19].
In the in-channel update phase, both channel βAC and
channel βBD need to update its distribution of balance to
keep consistency. Possible exceptions that may occur in this
phase include: (1) A is dishonest and does not send the result
micu to C; and (2) C is malicious and does not reply A
with confirmation mconf. For case (1), A is dishonest and
deliberately conceals the result of the capacity transfer phase
from C, and hence C is unable to determine the funding
capacity of channel βAC . As discussed in the prepare phase,
in this situation, C simply waits until T expires and then
complain to H 6⊂. For case (2), C gets micu from A but doesn’t
reply with confirmation mconf. This situation is similar to (1).
To resolve this issue, A just waits until T expires and then
contacts H 6⊂ to enforce C’s confirmation.
IV. FORMAL DESCRIPTION
Universally Composable model: In the UC model [4], the
security of a protocol is defined by comparing the execution
of the protocol in the real-world model with an ideal process.
In real-world model, the n-party protocol pi is executed by
a set of parties P ∈ {P1, P2, ..., Pn}, which is modeled as
probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) machine. In real-world
there exists an adversary A, who can corrupt some of these
parties such that the internal state and all the future actions of
the corrupted party are totally controlled by the adversary. For
simplicity, we only consider static corruption, which means
that the adversary A must decide which parties to corrupt at
the beginning of protocol execution. Both the parties and the
adversary A receive inputs and output to the environment Z ,
which is used to model all factors that are external to the
current protocol execution. In the ideal-world, the environment
Z interacts with the ideal functionality F via the so-called
dummy parties, who simply forward messages from Z to F
and back. The counterpart of the adversary A in the ideal-
world is the simulator S. Then we say a protocol pi is
considered secure if the environment Z can not distinguish
whether it is interacting with A and pi running in real-world
model or with S and ideal functionality F in ideal process.
Communication model: For the sake of simplicity, we
assume a synchronous communication model in which all
parties proceeds in synchronous round and all parties start
simultaneously. In this model, every party can send messages
to all other parties and the message sent in round i arrives
at its destination at the beginning of round i + 1. When it
comes to the ideal functionalities, we simply assume that
the computation of ideal functionalities and communication
with ideal functionalities are instantaneous. The synchronous
communication model can be achieved by a global clock
functionality. For further details, we refer to [16], [17], [20].
The ledger functionality FL: Following [9], we model the
global ledger as an ideal functionality FL. The internal state
of FL consists of a public-accessed account space denoted
as B : αi → pi, where αi ∈ {0, 1}λ denotes either an
external account or contract account, and pi ∈ N0 denotes the
balance of account αi. The ledger functionality FL provides
the following interface:
• transfer, which allows to transfers p coins from account αi
to αj via sending message (transfer, sid, αi, αj , p).
To simplify notation, we assume that every ideal functionality
Ff has a special account αf . When we say that the ideal func-
tionality Ff receives a message m together with p coins from
A, we actually mean that upon receiving message m, the ideal
functionality Ff sends a message (transfer, sid, αA, αf , p) to
FL. Similarly, when we say that the ideal functionality Ff
sends p coins back to A, we actually mean that Ff sends a
message (transfer, sid, αf , αA, p) to FL. The transfer interface
also allows the simulator S to simulate the “irrational” parties
who are willing to sacrifice their funds to cause honest parties
to lose some or all of their funds. In such cases, we simply
let S to transfer coins from the account of the irrational party
to the honest one. We note that the ideal functionality FL
mentioned above only captures the basic ideal concept of
the global ledger for the convenience of exposition. A more
accurate and realistic formalization of the global ledger can be
found in [22].
The channel hub functionality FN : In Figure 2, we outline
the ideal functionality of the channel hub FN . The channel
hub functionality FN maintains a channel space denoted as
N : βi → ci, where βi ∈ {0, 1}λ denotes the contract account
of channel βi, and ci ∈ N0 denotes the funding capacity of
channel βi. When we say that a payment channel β is marked
as joined, we mean that an entry corresponded to channel
β is added to N . Similarly, when we say that a payment
channel β is marked as withdrawn, we mean that the entry
corresponded to channel β is removed from N . The channel
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hub functionality FN provides the join and withdraw interfaces
for other ideal functionalities and the interface transfer for
parties. (1) join: When triggered by a joining request together
with c coins from an ideal functionalities, where c denotes the
funding capacity of the channel β, the ideal functionality FN
marks the channel β as joined. (2) transfer: Upon receiving an
iou request (iou, βAC , βBD,∆x) from A and a signed receipt
from B, FN moves ∆x coins from channel βAC to βBD. (3)
withdraw: a payment channel βi can withdraw from a channel
hub at any time by sending a withdrawal request to FN . The
ideal functionality FN will eventually send ci coins back to
the contract account of β and marks channel βi as withdrawn.
The Ideal Functionality FN
Join
Upon receiving message (join, sid, β,H 6⊂, c) together
with c coins from an ideal functionality F of ses-
sion sid, where H 6⊂ denotes the target channel hub
instance, FN adds an entry (β → c) to N and outputs
(joined, sid, β,H6⊂, c). If there already exists an entry
corresponded to β in N , then FN outputs (join-failed).
Transfer
Upon receiving miou := (iou, sid, βAC , βBD, ∆x,
mACgcc , m
BD
gcc ), where m
AC
gcc := (gcc, sid, βAC , βBD,
∆x, H 6⊂) and mBDgcc is defined analogously, from A in
round 1, FN checks if N (βAC) >= ∆x. If this not
holds then FN outputs (transfer-failed) and terminates
this procedure. Otherwise FN notifies B with the miou.
If FN receives the (receipt, sid, βAC , βBD, ∆x, mACgcc ,
mBDgcc ) from B in round 2, then FN set N (βAC) =
N (βAC) − ∆x,N (βBD) = N (βBD) + ∆x and out-
puts (transferred, sid, βAC , βBD, ∆x, mACgcc , m
BD
gcc ).
Otherwise, outputs (transfer-failed).
Withdraw
Upon receiving message (withdraw, sid, β,H 6⊂, c)
from F of session sid, FN checks if N (β) = c. If this
is not the case then outputs (withdraw-failed). Other-
wise, FN marks channel β as withdrawn, sends c coins
back to F , and outputs (withdrawn, sid, β,H 6⊂, c).
Fig. 2: The ideal functionality FN for channel hub
The contract functionality FC: In Figure 4, we outline the
contract functionality FC , which is the ideal functionality of
the payment channel contract deployed on the blockchain. The
contract functionality FC maintains the set of active contract
instance. Each contract instance corresponds to a payment
channel. A contract instance is created when a payment
channel is opened and removed when the payment channel
is closed. The contract functionality FC provides open, join,
withdraw, and close interfaces for parties.
UC definition of security: Let Boros be a protocol with
access to the global ledger functionality FL, the channel hub
ideal functionality FN , and the contract functionality FC . The
output of an environment Z interacting with Boros and an
adversary A on security parameter λ ∈ N, and auxiliary input
x ∈ {0, 1}∗ is denoted as EXECFL,FN ,FCBoros,A,Z (λ, x). In ideal
world, we use IDEALFL,FN ,FCFH,S,Z (λ, x) to denote the output
of Z runing with the ideal functionality FH and the simulator
S .
Definition 1: Let λ ∈ N be a security parameter and x ∈
{0, 1}∗ be an auxiliary input, Boros be a protocol runing in
the (FL, FN , FC)-hybrid world. We say that protocol Boros
realize the ideal functionality FH if for every adversary A
there exists a simulator S such that for all PPT environments
Z:
EXECFL,FN ,FCBoros,A,Z (λ, x) ≈ IDEALFL,FN ,FCFH,S,Z (λ, x)
where “≈” denotes computational indistinguishability.
A. Ideal Functionality FH for Boros
The ideal functionality FH, as shown in Figure 3, maintains
two channel spaces. One of the two channel space consists
of payment channels that have not yet joined the channel
hub. We denote it as B : β → {c, θw}, where β ∈ {0, 1}λ
denotes the contract account of channel β, c ∈ N0 denotes the
funding capacity of channel β, and θw denotes the distribution
function of its total funds corresponds to the version number
w. For example, in channel βAC , we use θACw (A) to denotes
A’s balance and θACw (C) to denote C’s balance corresponds to
the version number w. We note that when it does not affect the
clarity of expression, we often omit the superscript. Moreover,
we always have c = θw(A) + θw(C) and θw(Pi) ≥ 0. The
monotonically increasing version number w is used for tracing
every transfer in a payment channel and is initially set to 1. The
other channel space, which is denoted as B 6⊂ : β → {c, θw},
consists of payment channels that have already joined the
channel hub. When we say that a payment channel β is marked
as joined, we mean that the channel β has been moved from
channel space B to B 6⊂. Similarly, a payment channel β is
marked as withdrawn means that the channel β has been moved
from B6⊂ back to B.
The ideal functionality FH offers the following interfaces
for the parties: (1) open a payment channel between two
parties. When receiving both the opening requests from A
and C together with xa and xc coins respectively, a payment
channel βAC of funding capacity c = xa + xc is opened. (2)
in-channel transfer. A two-phase process for performing off-
chain transfers. When triggered by A with an update request,
FH asks C for the confirmation of that transfer. Once C replies
with his confirmation, FH updates the distribution function
for channel βAC and outputs (updated). (3) join a channel
hub. A payment channel can join a channel hub only when
both parties reach an agreement and the payment channel has
not yet joined any channel hub. When triggered by A with a
joining request, FH asks C for the confirmation of that joining.
Once C replies with his confirmation, FH marks βAC as joined
and notifies about the result through the message (joined). (4)
cross-channel transfers. It can be performed only between two
payment channels that have already joined in the channel hub.
This process is divided into three phases. In the prepare phase,
both channel βAC and βBD should reach an agreement on
this transfer. In the capacity transfer phase, if FH receives
both the iou message from A and the receipt from B, then
FH updates its internal state such that the funding capacity
of channel βAC decreases by ∆x coins and βBD increases by
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Open a payment channel
Upon receiving (open, sid, βAC , xa) together with xa coins from A in round 1 and (open, sid, βAC , xc) together with xc
coins from C in round 2, FH adds a new entry (βAC → {c, θ1}) to B, where c = xa+xc, θ1(A) = xa, and θ1(C) = xc,
and outputs (opened, sid, βAC , c, θ1). Otherwise, FH sends xa coins back to A and outputs (open-failed).
In-channel transfer
Upon receiving (update, sid, βAC , θw+1) from A in round 1, where θw+1 denotes a new distribution function that
reflects the result of the update, FH sends a message (updating, sid, βAC , θw+1) to C. If next round C replies with
(update-ok, sid, βAC , θw+1), then FH sets (βAC → {c, θw+1}) and outputs (updated).
Join a channel hub
Upon receiving (join, sid, βAC ,H 6⊂) from A in round 1, where H 6⊂ denotes the target channel hub to join, FH checks
if βAC ∈ B6⊂. If this is the case then FH ignores the joining request and terminates this procedure. Otherwise FH sends
a message (join, sid, βAC ,H 6⊂, c, θw, σA) where σA denotes A’s signature on that message to C. If next round C replies
with (join, sid, βAC ,H 6⊂, c, θw, σA, σC), then FH marks channel βAC as joined and outputs (joined). Otherwise, FH
outputs (join-failed).
Cross-channel transfer
• Prepare phase
Upon receiving (cc-transfer, sid, βAC , βBD,∆x,H6⊂) from A in round 1, FH checks if the following three conditions
hold: (1) βAC ∈ B6⊂, (2) βBD ∈ B6⊂, and (3) θw(A) ≥ ∆x. If any of these conditions is not met then FH ignores
the message and terminates this procedure. Otherwise, FH sends (pcc, sid, βAC , βBD,∆x,H6⊂) to C. If FH receives
(gcc-ok) from C in next round, then FH broadcasts mACgcc := (gcc, sid, βAC , βBD,∆x,H 6⊂) to both A, C, B, and D
then goes to the next phase. Otherwise, FH terminates the procedure. Note that the interactions with B and D are
handled analogously.
• Capacity transfer phase
Upon receiving (iou, sid, βAC , βBD, ∆x, H 6⊂, mACgcc , mBDgcc ) from A in round 3 and (receipt, sid, βAC , βBD, ∆x,
H6⊂, mACgcc , mBDgcc ) from B in round 4, FH updates the channel space B 6⊂ such that (βAC → {c − ∆x, θACw }) and
(βBD → {c + ∆x, θBDw }), outputs mct := (transferred, sid, βAC , βBD, ∆x, mACgcc , mBDgcc ), and proceeds to the next
phase. Otherwise, FH terminates the procedure.
• In-channel update phase
Upon receiving (icu-request) from A in round 6, FH sets (βAC → {c−∆x, θw+1}), where θw+1(A) = θw(A)−∆x,
θw+1(C) = θw(C), and sends (inChannelUpdate, sid, βAC ,mct, θw+1) to C. If next round C replies with (conf-ok)
then FH sends (confirm, sid,mct, θw+1) to A and outputs (cc-transferred). Note that the interactions with B and D
are handled analogously.
Withdraw from channel hub
Upon receiving (withdraw, sid, βAC ,H6⊂) from A in round 1, FH checks if βAC ∈ B6⊂. If this is not the case then FH
ignores the withdrawal request. Otherwise, in round 3, FH marks channel βAC as withdrawn and outputs (withdrawn).
The withdrawal can be done in round 2 in the optimistic case, i.e., if FH also receives (withdraw, sid, βAC ,H6⊂) from
C in round 2.
Close a payment channel
Upon receiving (close, sid, βAC) from A in round 1, FH checks if βAC ∈ B6⊂. If this is the case then FH ignores the
closing request. Otherwise, in round 3, let θ be the distribution function of channel βAC , then FH sends θ(A) coins to
A and θ(C) coins to C, removes the entry that corresponds to channel βAC from B, and outputs (closed). The closing
process can be finished in round 2 in the optimistic case, i.e., when FH also receives (close, sid, βAC) from C in round
2.
Fig. 3: Ideal functionality FH for Boros
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Open a payment channel
(1) Upon receiving (open, sid, βAC , xa) together with xa coins from A in round 1, FC sends a opening request
(opening, sid, βAC) to C.
(2) If C replies with (open, sid, βAC , xc) together with xc coins in round 2, then FC outputs (opened, sid, βAC , c), where
c = xa+xc denotes the funding capacity of channel βAC . Otherwise, FC sends xa coins back to A’s account and outputs
(open-failed).
Join a channel hub
(1) Upon receiving (join, sid, βAC ,H 6⊂, c, θw, σA, σC) from C in round 2, where σA and σC denote A and C’s signature
on message (join, sid, βAC ,H 6⊂, c, θw) respectively, then FC sends a message (join, sid, βAC ,H 6⊂, c) together with c
coins to FN , obtains the response (joined) or (join-failed), and sends the response to both A and C in round 3.
Withdraw from channel hub
(1) Upon receiving (withdraw, sid, βAC ,H 6⊂, c, θw) from A in round 1, FC sends a withdrawal request (withdrawing) to
C.
(2) If C replies with (withdraw, sid, βAC ,H6⊂, c, θw) in next round, then FC sends (withdraw, sid, βAC ,H 6⊂, c) to FN .
Otherwise, FC sends the same withdrawal request to FN in round 3
(3) If a response (withdrawn, sid, βAC ,H 6⊂, c) together with c coins arrives from FN , then FC outputs (withdrawn) to
both A and C in round 3. Otherwise, outputs (withdraw-failed).
Close a payment channel
(1) Upon receiving message (close, sid, βAC , c, θw1) from A in round 1, FC notifies C of the closing request (closing).
(2) If C replies with (close, sid, βAC , c, θw2) in the next round, then FC sends θw(A) coins to A’s account and θw(C)
coins to C’s account, where w = max(w1, w2). Otherwise, FC sends θw1(A) coins to A’s account and θw1(C) coins to
C’s account in round 3. In both cases, FC outputs (closed) in round 3.
Fig. 4: The contract functionality FC
the same amount. We note that at the end of this phase, the
distribution function of both channel βAC and βBD remains
unchanged. The last phase is triggered by in-channel update
requests from A and B respectively. FH then asks C and D for
their confirmation, which finally results in the changing of the
distribution function of channel βAC and βBD. (5) withdraw
from channel hub. A payment channel can withdraw from the
channel hub only when the payment channel has already joined
in the channel hub. When receiving the withdrawal request
from A or C, FH finally marks channel βAC as withdrawn and
outputs (withdrawn). Our ideal functionality guarantees that
an honest party will always manage to withdraw his payment
channel from the channel hub in a fixed time. (6) close a
payment channel. When triggered by a closing request from A
or C, FH finally refunds A with θ(A) coins and C with θ(C)
coins within three rounds. Our ideal functionality guarantees
that an honest party will always manage to close the payment
channel and get refunded in a fixed time.
Now we discuss how our ideal functionality FH satisfies
the security properties mentioned in Section III-C.
• Consensus on channel hub enrollment and withdrawal.
Once a payment channel joins in or withdraws from a
channel hub, the ideal functionality FH would notify all
parties of the results through messages (joined), (withdrawn)
or (join-failed). Thus it is straightforward to see that this
property always holds.
• Consensus on channel capacity. The initial funding capac-
ity of a payment channel is settled and notified by the ideal
functionality FH when successfully opening the channel.
Besides, an honest party is guaranteed to be notified by the
FH of the results of capacity transfers through message mct.
Thus, an honest party can always learn the funding capacity
of its payment channels.
• Balance security. The analysis of balance security consists
of two points. One is the consensus on the funding capacity
of the payment channel. The other is the consensus on
the final distribution function of the payment channel. The
former is discussed above. For the distribution function, FH
always guarantees that the distribution function with larger
version number w always wins when closing the payment
channel. Thus, an honest party with the latest distribution
function is guaranteed to be paid out with the correct amount
of coins when closing a payment channel.
B. The Boros Protocol
Now we formally describe the Boros protocol, which
consists of the contract functionality FC as shown in Figure 4
and the specification of the behavior of all involved parties as
shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6.
We firstly discuss those operations that share with tradi-
tional payment channels, which are shown in Figure 5. To open
a payment channel, A deploys a new instance of contract FC
together with xa coins. Upon construction, the contract FC
notifies C with the opening request. Once the contract gets a
confirmation from C together with xc coins in round 2, then
the payment channel βAC is opened. Otherwise, the contract
FC refunds A with xa coins and outputs (open-failed).
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Open a payment channel
A: Upon receiving message (open, sid, βAC , xa) from the environment Z in round 1, A sends a signed message
(open, sid, βAC , xa) together with xa coins to FC and goes to the Common Steps below.
C: Upon receiving (open, sid, βAC , xc) from Z in round 1, C waits for the opening request (opening, sid, βAC) from
FC . If the message does not arrive then C outputs (open-failed) and terminates this procedure. Otherwise, C replies
FC with (open, sid, βAC , xc) with xc coins in round 2 and goes to the Common Steps.
Common Steps: If P ∈ {A,C} receives (opened, sid, βAC , c) from FC in round 3 then P outputs (opened) and goes
idle. If P receives (open-failed) from FC then outputs (open-failed) and terminates this procedure.
In-channel transfer
A: Upon receiving (update, sid, βAC , θ) from the environment Z in round 1, A sends a message mu := (updating, sid,
βAC , θw+1) to C, where θw+1 = θ denotes the distribution function with a new version number w+ 1. If A receives
(update-ok, sid, βAC , θw+1) from C in round 3 then he outputs (updated).
C: Upon receiving the updating request mu from A, C checks whether θw+1(A)+θw+1(C) is equal to the latest capacity
of channel βAC that C is aware of. If this does not hold, then C ignores the updating request mu and terminates this
procedure. Otherwise, C sends a message (update-request) to the environment Z . If Z replies with (update-ok) then
C sends (update-ok, sid, βAC , θw+1) to A and outputs (updated).
Close a payment channel
A: Upon receiving (close, sid, βAC) from the environment Z in round 1, A sends a message (close, sid, βAC , c, θwA) toFC , where c and θwA denote the latest funding capacity and distribution function that A is aware of. If A receives
(closed) in round 3 then he outputs (closed) and terminates this procedure.
C: Upon receiving (close, sid, βAC) from Z in round 1, C waits for the closing request (closing, sid, βAC , c, θwA) fromFC . If the message does not arrive then C outputs (close-failed) and terminates this procedure. Otherwise, C replies
FC with (close, sid, βAC , c, θwC ) in round 2. If C receives (closed) in round 3 then he outputs (closed) and terminates
this procedure.
Fig. 5: Formal protocol Boros Part I
Once the payment channel βAC is opened, A and C can
perform in-channel transfers without involving the blockchain.
Firstly, A sends an update request to C, which contains a new
distribution function θw+1. When C receives that request, it
should check the validity of the capacity of channel βAC ,
that is, θw+1(A) + θw+1(C) should always be equal to the
latest capacity of channel βAC . If this is the case, then C
sends a message (update-request) to the environment Z , asking
if it agrees for an update. If the environment responds with
(update-ok), then C sends A with a confirmation to complete
that in-channel transfer. We emphasize that the validity check
of channel capacity is necessary since the funding capacity
of our payment channel could be changed by cross-channel
transfers.
To close a payment channel βAC , A sends a closing request
containing his last distribution function θw1 to the contract
instance FC . Upon receiving the closing request from A, the
contract then forwards that request to C. If next round C replies
with his last distribution function θw2, then the contract FC
chooses the latest one, which is denoted as θw where w =
max(w1, w2), and sends coins back to accounts of both A
and C according to θw. Otherwise, the contract FC sends coins
back to accounts of both A and C according to θw1.
Then we discuss those extended operations, which are
shown in Figure 6. We start with the joining process. To join a
channel hub, A sends a message containing the target channel
hub instance H 6⊂, the funding capacity c, the latest distribution
function θw of channel βAC , and A’s signature σA on that
message to C. Upon receiving the joining request from A, C
sends a message (join-request) to the environment Z , asking
if it agrees for that joining. If the environment responds with
(join-ok), then C sends the joining request containing both A
and C’s signature to the contract FC . Once the contract receives
that signed joining request from C, it sends a joining request
together with c coins to the channel hub FN to finish the
joining process. Otherwise, the joining procedure is considered
failed.
Now we discuss the cross-channel transfer procedure,
which is divided into three phases. In the first phase, A sends a
message mpcc to C, indicating his intention to perform a cross-
channel transfer, which moves ∆x coins using A’s balance
in channel βAC to channel βBD via the channel hub H 6⊂.
When C receives mpcc from A, he checks if the A’s balance
in channel βAC exceeds ∆x. If this is not the case, then
C rejects the cross-channel transfer request. Otherwise, if C
agrees with that transfer, then he attaches his signature on
the mpcc to produce mgcc, which indicates C’s permission on
that cross-channel transfer. Then C broadcasts the message
mgcc to A, B, and D, and goes to the third phase. The
interaction between B and D is handled analogously. In the
capacity transfer phase, the initiator A sends an iou message
to the channel hub H 6⊂. As mentioned in the channel hub
functionality FN , the channel hubH 6⊂ forwards the iou request
to B, obtains B’s signed receipt, and then executes that transfer.
The execution will cause the funding capacity of channel βAC
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Join a channel hub
A: Upon receiving (join, sid, βAC , H 6⊂) from the environment Z in round 1, A sends mj := (join, sid, βAC , H 6⊂, c,
θw, σA), where σA denotes A’s signature on that message, to C and goes to the Common Steps below.
C: Upon receiving the joining request mj from A, C sends a message (join-request) to the environment Z . If Z replies
with (join-ok) then C computes its signature and sends (join, sid, βAC ,H 6⊂, c, θw, σA, σC) to FC and goes to the
Common Steps.
Common Steps: If P ∈ {A,C} receives (joined, sid, βAC ,H 6⊂, c, θw) from FC in round 3 then P outputs (joined) and
goes idle. If P receives (join-failed) from FC then outputs (join-failed) and terminates this procedure.
Cross-channel transfer
• Prepare
A: Upon receiving message (cc-transfer, sid, βAC , βBD,∆x,H6⊂) from Z in round 1. If ∆x > θw(A) where θw
denotes the last distribution function that A is aware of, then A ignores this message, otherwise A sends a message
mpcc := (pcc, sid, βAC , βBD,∆x,H 6⊂) to C.
C: Upon receiving mpcc from A in round 2, C sends a message (gcc-request, sid, βAC , βBD,∆x,H6⊂) to the
environment Z . If Z replies with (gcc-ok) then C broadcasts mACgcc := (gcc, sid, βAC , βBD,∆x,H 6⊂) to both
A, B, and D. Otherwise, C terminates this procedure.
The Behavior of B and D is handled analogously. Note that at the beginning of round 3, both A, C, B, and D should
hold mACgcc and m
BD
gcc . Otherwise, they terminate this procedure.• Capacity transfer
A: In round 3, A sends message miou := (iou, sid, βAC , βBD,∆x,H6⊂,mACgcc ,mBDgcc ) to the ideal functionality FN . If
A receives msgct := (transferred, sid, βAC , βBD,∆x,mACgcc ,m
BD
gcc ) from FN in round 5 then A proceeds to the
next phase. Otherwise, A terminates this procedure.
B: Upon receiving message miou from FN in round 4, B checks the validity of miou and replies with a signed receipt
(receipt, sid, βAC , βBD,∆x,H6⊂,mACgcc ,mBDgcc ) to FN . If B receives msgct from FN in round 5 then B proceeds
to the next phase. Otherwise, B terminates this procedure.
• In-channel update
A: In round 6, A sends micu := (inChannelUpdate, sid, βAC ,mct, θw+1) to C where θw+1(A) = θw(A) − ∆x and
θw+1(C) = θw(C), θw denotes the last distribution function that A is aware of before that cross-channel transfer.
If A receives mconf := (confirm, sid,mct, θw+1) from C then A outputs (cc-transferred) and goes idle.
C: If C receives micu from A in round 7, C sends a message (conf-request, sid,mct, θw+1) to the environment Z . If
Z replies with (conf-ok) then C sends the confirmation mconf to A, outputs (cc-transferred), and goes idle.
The Behavior of B and D is handled analogously.
Withdraw from channel hub
A: Upon receiving (withdraw, sid, βAC ,H 6⊂) from Z in round 1, A sends a message (withdraw, sid, βAC ,H6⊂, c, θw) to
FC where c and θw denotes the funding capacity and the distribution function of channel βAC that A is aware of.
Then A goes to the Common Steps.
C: Upon receiving (withdraw, sid, βAC ,H 6⊂) from Z in round 1, C waits for the arrival of
(withdrawing, sid, βAC ,H 6⊂, c, θw) from FC . If the message does not arrive then C outputs (withdraw-failed) and
terminates this procedure. Otherwise, C checks the validity of c and θw, replies with (withdraw, sid, βAC ,H 6⊂, c, θw),
and goes to the Common Steps.
Common Steps: If P ∈ {A,C} receives (withdrawn, sid, βAC ,H6⊂, c, θw) from FC in round 3 then P outputs (withdrawn)
and goes idle. If P receives (withdraw-failed) then outputs (withdraw-failed) and terminates this procedure.
Fig. 6: Formal protocol Boros Part II
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to be decreased by ∆x coins and βBD increased by the same
amount. If the execution successes, then H 6⊂ will notify both
A and B about execution result through message mct. In the
in-channel update phase, A sends the result of the second
phase to C. The message sent by A should include a new
distribution function θw+1 such that θw+1(A) = θw(A)−∆x
and θw+1(C) = θw(C), and the signed result from the operator
server of channel hub H 6⊂. Upon receiving this message, C
checks its validity and replies with a confirmation to finish the
cross-channel transfer.
Finally, we discuss the withdrawal procedure. To withdraw
from the channel hub, A sends a message containing the latest
funding capacity c and distribution function θw of channel βAC
to the contract FC . Upon receiving the withdrawal request from
A, the contract FC notifies to C of that withdrawal request.
Once receiving a signed reply from C, the contract FC sends
a withdrawal request to the channel hub FN to finish the
withdrawal process.
C. Security Definition
Now we formally state the security of our Boros protocol.
Due to the page limit, formal security proof is provided in
Appendix A.
Theorem 1: Protocol Boros securely realizes functionality
FH in the (FL,FN ,FC)-hybrid model.
TABLE I: The Execution Cost of Each Operation.
#
on-
chain
cost
#
off-
chain
# sigs
txs gas Ether USD msgs
open 2 173147 0.0034 0.84 0 2
in-channel transfer 0 0 0 0 2 2
join 1 154723 0.0030 0.75 0 2
cross-channel transfer 0 0 0 0 17 17
withdraw 2 97749 0.0019 0.47 0 2
close 2 148413 0.0029 0.72 0 2
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We implement the Boros protocol on Ethereum and mea-
sure the execution cost of each operation in the Boros protocol.
Note that our current implementation aims at demonstrating the
feasibility of the Boros protocol and we will further optimize
it in future work. Moreover, we simulate off-chain payment
networks of different sizes and prove that our construction can
effectively shorten the average transaction path length.
Ethereum uses gas to measure the amount of computational
resource used to execute certain operations. Every instruction
executed by the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) costs a
certain amount of gas. There is no fixed price of the conversion
between gas and Ether. It is up to the sender of a transaction
to specify a gas price, which affects the willingness of the
miners to process the transaction. A lower gas price results
in longer waiting time for a transaction to be mined. The
average gas price is typically on the order of about 20 Gwei
(or 2×10−8 Ether). When we prepar this paper, the exchange
rate of the Ether against the US dollar is 1:243.2. That is,
1 gas = 2× 10−8 Ether = 4.864× 10−6 USD.
Our evaluation adopts the following criteria: the number
of on-chain transactions, the execution cost measured in gas,
Ether, and USD, the number of off-chain messages, and the
number of signatures, which is dominant for both message
length and computational complexity. Table I shows the exe-
cution cost of each operation under these metrics.
Then, we simulate payment networks of different sizes to
evaluate the effectiveness of our construction on shortening
the average path length. In particular, we control the overall
construction cost and then measure the average path length for
each approach. We first set up an underlying payment network
of different size, then (a) open additional payment channels
(b) set up one/multiple payment hub (c) set up one/multiple
channel hub. We ensure that the above settings cost the same
with each other. For comparison with bare payment network,
since the execution cost of a join operation is similar to
opening a new payment channel in terms of gas cost (see Table
I), we randomly open the same number of payment channels on
the underlying payment network. Then we extract transactions
from the Ripple dataset [36] and replay them in those settings.
To find a path for each transaction, we use the SpeedyMurmurs
[35] algorithm and the Floyd-Warshall shortest path algorithm
respectively.
For the case with only one channel hub, since a pay-
ment/channel hub cannot hold too many participants (limited
by the operator server), we set up small payment networks
where the number of nodes ranges from 200 to 1000. An
important system parameter is the ratio of the number of nodes
to payment channels, which determines the density of the
payment network. In fact, the higher the density of the payment
network, the lower the average path length between nodes, and
the less necessary to deploy the channel hub. We refer to the
Ripple dataset [36] and the Lightning Network [1]. When we
prepare this article, the Ripple data set contains 67149 nodes
and 199574 edges with a ratio of 2.97, the Lightning Network
contains 8655 nodes and 34696 edges with a ratio of 4.0.
We choose 4 as the ratio of the number of nodes to payment
channels of the payment network for our simulations. Another
important system parameter is the joining ratio, denoted as
α, which indicates how many participants will be joined
into the payment/channel hub. Table II shows the simulation
results with only one channel hub, where PN denotes the
“Payment Network”, PH denotes the “Payment Hub”, CH
denotes the “Channel Hub”, FW denotes the Floyd-Warshall
shortest path algorithm, and SM denotes the SpeedyMurmurs
routing algorithm. ∆1 corresponds to the improvement of our
construction over the payment hub, and ∆2 corresponds to the
promotion over the payment network.
For the case of multiple channel hubs, the size of the
underlying payment network can be further expanded. We
simulate payment networks of 5,000 nodes and 10,000 nodes.
In these cases, we limit the maximum number of participants
per hub, denoted as k, ranging from 100 to 200, and then create
multiple payment/channel hubs. The number of hubs can be
easily calculated by dn×αk e, where n denotes the size of the
payment network. Similarly, we set the ratio of the number of
nodes to payment channels of the underlying payment network
to 4 and test the effect of different α and k on the average path
length. Table 2 shows the simulation results.
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TABLE II: Avg. Path Length With One Hub
α # of Nodes PN-FW PH-FW CH-FW ∆1-FW ∆2-FW PN-SM PH-SM CH-SM ∆1-SM ∆2-SM
200 2.77 2.74 2.66 3.0% 3.9% 4.01 3.99 3.65 8.7% 9.1%
400 3.10 3.03 2.93 3.4% 5.5% 4.71 4.58 4.03 11.9% 14.5%
600 3.30 3.19 3.05 4.5% 7.4% 5.06 4.76 4.32 9.3% 14.5%
800 3.44 3.32 3.12 5.9% 9.4% 5.33 4.92 4.27 13.3% 20.0%
5%
1000 3.55 3.40 3.22 5.5% 9.3% 5.53 5.13 4.20 18.3% 24.2%
200 2.76 2.67 2.50 6.2% 9.5% 4.04 3.88 3.31 14.7% 18.1%
400 3.09 2.90 2.70 6.8% 12.7% 4.59 4.04 3.53 12.6% 23.0%
600 3.29 3.04 2.78 8.5% 15.6% 5.02 4.31 3.49 19.1% 30.5%
800 3.42 3.12 2.81 10.0% 17.8% 5.25 4.40 3.54 19.5% 32.6%
10%
1000 3.53 3.19 2.86 10.4% 19.1% 5.58 4.28 3.48 18.7% 37.5%
200 2.74 2.57 2.28 11.3% 16.8% 4.01 3.53 2.84 19.6% 29.2%
400 3.08 2.75 2.48 9.8% 19.4% 4.62 3.75 2.99 20.2% 35.3%
600 3.26 2.84 2.50 12.0% 23.4% 4.96 3.72 2.97 20.1% 40.0%
800 3.41 2.88 2.53 12.2% 25.6% 5.31 3.40 2.92 14.1% 45.0%
15%
1000 3.50 2.92 2.56 12.4% 26.9% 5.49 3.62 2.71 25.2% 50.7%
TABLE III: Avg. Path Length With Multiple Hubs
α # of Nodes Hub Size # of Hubs PN-FW PH-FW CH-FW ∆1-FW ∆2-FW PN-SM PH-SM CH-SM ∆1-SM ∆2-SM
5000 100 3 4.31 4.03 3.72 7.7% 13.7% 7.06 5.98 4.95 17.2% 29.9%
5000 200 2 4.31 3.95 3.64 7.8% 15.7% 7.09 5.60 4.50 19.7% 36.5%
10000 100 5 4.64 4.30 3.93 8.8% 15.4% 7.77 6.47 5.14 20.6% 33.9%
5%
10000 200 3 4.64 4.20 3.81 9.4% 17.9% 7.76 6.06 4.70 22.4% 39.4%
5000 100 5 4.30 3.79 3.35 11.5% 21.9% 7.07 5.25 4.16 20.7% 41.2%
5000 200 3 4.29 3.67 3.22 12.3% 25.0% 7.08 4.83 3.79 21.4% 46.4%
10000 100 10 4.61 4.07 3.56 12.6% 22.9% 7.70 5.91 4.41 25.5% 42.8%
10%
10000 200 5 4.62 3.90 3.40 12.8% 26.3% 7.74 5.24 4.00 23.6% 48.3%
5000 100 8 4.27 3.64 3.14 13.8% 26.4% 7.01 5.14 3.83 25.5% 45.4%
5000 200 4 4.27 3.47 2.99 14.0% 30.0% 7.02 4.47 3.43 23.3% 51.2%
10000 100 15 4.59 3.90 3.32 14.9% 27.8% 7.70 5.65 4.03 28.5% 47.6%
15%
10000 200 8 4.59 3.71 3.17 14.7% 31.1% 7.70 5.03 3.74 25.6% 51.4%
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we propose channel hub to support trans-
ferring coints directly from one payment channel to another
within the same hub. Base on this idea, we design a novel
protocol named Boros to perform secure off-chain cross-
channel transfers. The Boros protocol guarantees that an
honest party will not bear any financial losses despite strong
adversarial capabilities. We present the security definition of
the Boros protocol formally and prove its security using
the UC-framework. Moreover, we develop a prototype on
Ethereum and measure the execution cost of each operation
in the Boros protocol. Our evaluation on payment networks of
different configurations shows that our protocol can effectively
shorten the off-chain routing path. In future work, we will
investigate how to optimize the channel hub. For example,
in current design, all transactions in a channel hub are fully
ordered and executed by the operator server, but a considerable
number of transactions can be partially ordered. Exploiting this
observation may improve the performance.
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APPENDIX A
SECURITY PROOF
Proof: Proof of Theorem 1
Let A be an adversary that interacts with parties running
protocol Boros in the (FL,FN ,FC)-hybrid model. We con-
struct an ideal-process adversary S, which is also called the
simulator, such that the view of any environment Z from an
interaction with A and Boros is distributed identically to its
view of interaction with S in the ideal process for FH. As
usual, the simulator S runs a simulated copy of A. Any input
from environment Z is forwarded to A, and any output of A
is copied to the output of S.
In addition, S proceeds as follows:
Open a payment channel: Simulating the opening proce-
dure is quite straightforward. We let S simulate the behaviors
of the contract functionality FC and honest parties. Then
opening procedure starts from Z sending (open, sid, βAC ,
xa) to A and (open, sid, βAC , xc) to C. If A is not corrupted
and sends a message (open, sid, βAC , xa) together with xa
coins to FC in round 1, then S sends (transfer, sid, A, αC ,
xa) to the ledger functionality FL, and (opening, sid, βAC)
to C in the name of FC . Otherwise, if A is corrupted, then S
terminates the simulation. Next round if C sends (open, sid,
βAC , xc) together with xc coins to FC , then S sends (transfer,
sid, C, αC , xc) to FL, and outputs (opened, sid, βAC , c) in
the name of FC . Otherwise, if C is corrupted and does not
send his (open), then S sends (transfer, sid,αC , A, xa) to FL
in the name of FC and outputs (open-failed) in round 3.
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In-channel transfer: To simulate the in-channel transfer
procedure, we just let S simulate the behaviors of honest par-
ties. The in-channel transfer procedure starts from Z sending
(update, sid, βAC , θ) to the initiator A. If A sends (updating,
sid, βAC , θ) to C, then S sends (update, sid, βAC , θ) to the
ideal functionality FH in the name of A. If C is not corrupted
and sends (update-ok, sid, βAC , θ) to A in next round, then
S sends (update-ok, sid, βAC , θ) to FH in the name of C. If
C is corrupted and does not send (update-ok, sid, βAC , θ) to
A, then A fails to learn the result of that update. According to
our assumption (mentioned in Section III-B), an honest party
does not engage in any other further transfers if he detects that
some other party is dishonest. In such a situation, the honest
party will terminate the protocol with the dishonest one, which
means that he will launch a withdrawal from channel hub if
needed and then close the payment channel. One possible case
is that the update is beneficial to C and C is rational. In such
case, C will commit the result of this update to the contract
functionality FC when closing the channel. In other words,
this update does happen no matter if C does not send the
(update-ok, sid, βAC , θ) to A. Thus we simply let S send a
(update-ok, sid, βAC , θ) to FH in the name of C to make
this update happened. In other cases, either when this update
is not beneficial to C or C is irrational, C does not commit the
result of this update when closing the channel. In these cases,
we just let S move the appropriate amount of funds from C
to A using the transfer interface provided by FL.
Join a channel hub: To simulate the joining procedure, we
just let S simulate the behaviors of honest parties, contract
functionality FC and channel hub functionality FN . Note that
when successfully joined, S has to simulate the transfer of
funding capacity c from the special account of FC (denoted as
αC) to FN (denoted as αN ). The joining procedure starts from
Z sending (join, sid, βAC ,H 6⊂) to A. If A is not corrupted and
sends a message (join, sid, βAC , H 6⊂, c, θw, σA) to C in round
1, then S sends (join, sid, βAC ,H 6⊂) to the ideal functionality
FH in the name of A. Otherwise, if A is corrupted, then S
terminates the simulation. Next round if C sends (join, sid,
βAC , H6⊂, c, θw, σA, σC) to FC , then S sends (join, sid, βAC ,
c), where c denotes the funding capacity of channel βAC ,to
FN in the name of FC , sends (transfer, sid, αC , αN , c) to
FL in the name of FN , and outputs (joined).
Cross-channel transfer: To simulate the cross-channel
transfer procedure, we let S simulate the behaviors of honest
parties and the channel hub functionality FN . The simulation
of cross-channel transferring can be divided into three phases.
In the first phase, namely the prepare phase, A, C, B, and
D should reach an agreement on the transfer, which means that
all of them should hold the mACgcc and m
BD
gcc at the end of this
phase. Otherwise, they abort this transfer. The prepare phase
starts from Z sending (cc-transfer, sid, βAC , βBD, ∆x, H6⊂)
to both A and B. The interactions between A and C, B and
D is analogous. Thus we only take A and C as an example.
If A sends (pcc, sid, βAC , βBD, ∆x, H 6⊂) to C in round 1,
then S sends (cc-transfer, sid, βAC , βBD, ∆x, H 6⊂) to FH
in the name of A. Otherwise, S terminates this simulation.
If next round C broadcasts (gcc, sid, βAC , βBD, ∆x, H 6⊂),
then S sends (gcc-ok) to FH in the name of C. Otherwise, if
C is malicious and does not agree with this transfer, then S
terminates this simulation.
In the second phase, the capacity transfer is performed
through the ideal functionality FN by A and B. Thus we
simply let S simulate the behaviors of functionality FN and
honest parties. If A sends (iou, sid, βAC , βBD, ∆x, H6⊂,
mACgcc , m
BD
gcc ) to FN in round 3, then S forwards that (iou)
request to B in the name of FN . Otherwise, S terminates this
simulation. If next round B replies with (receipt, sid, βAC ,
βBD, ∆x,H6⊂, mACgcc , mBDgcc ) to FN , then S sends (transferred,
sid, βAC , βBD, ∆x, H6⊂, mACgcc , mBDgcc ) to both A, C, B and
D in the name of FN and proceeds to the last phase.
In the last phase, again, the interaction between A and C,
B and D is analogous. Thus we only take A and C as an
example. If A sends (inChannelUpdate, sid, βAC , mct, θw+1)
to C, then S sends (icu-request) to FH in the name of A. If
next round C replies A with (confirm, sid, mct, θw+1), then
S sends (conf-ok) to FH in the name of C.
Withdraw from channel hub: To simulate the withdrawal
procedure, we let S simulate the behaviors of honest parties,
contract functionality FC and channel hub functionality FN .
Again, S needs to simulate the transfer of funding capacity
when successfully withdrawn. The withdrawal procedure starts
from Z sending (withdraw, sid, βAC , H 6⊂) to both A and C
or a corrupted party sending a withdrawal request to FC . We
note that an honest party cannot prevent malicious one from
withdrawing a payment channel. If A sends (withdraw, sid,
βAC ,H6⊂, c, θw) to FC in round 1, then S sends (withdrawing)
to C in the name of FC . Otherwise, S just terminates the
simulation. Next round if C sends message (withdraw, sid,
βAC , H 6⊂, c, θw) to FC , then S sends (withdraw, sid, βAC ,
c) to FN in the name of FC , sends (transfer, sid, αN , αC ,
c) to FL in the name of FN , and outputs (withdrawed). If C
does not reply with (withdraw) in round 2, then S postpones
the same actions until round 3.
Close a payment channel: To simulate the closing proce-
dure, we let S simulate the behaviors of honest parties and the
contract functionality FC . The closing procedure starts from
Z sending (close, sid, βAC) to both A and C or a corrupted
party trying to close the payment channel unilaterally. We
note that an honest party still cannot prevent malicious one
from closing a payment channel. If A sends a signed message
(close, sid, βAC , c, θwA) to FC in round 1, then S sends
(closing) to C in the name of FC . Otherwise, S terminates the
simulation. In round 3, S sends (transfer, sid, αC , A, xa) and
(transfer, sid, αC , C, xc) to FL in the name of FC , and outputs
(closed). In case when C sends (close, sid, βAC , c, θwC ) to FC
in round 2, then S does the same actions in round 2. The
value of xa and xc depends on the behaviors of both A and
C. As mentioned above, if there exist irrational parties willing
to sustain financial loses in order to cause the other to lose its
funds, we just let S to move funds from the account of the
dishonest party to the honest one using the transfer interface.
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